Information technology innovations and commercial banking: A review and appraisal from an historical perspective by Bernardo Batiz-Lazo & Douglas Wood
Information technology innovations
and commercial banking:






ISBN 0 7492 45476
© The Open University
© Bernado Bátiz-Lazo, Douglas Wood
© Manchester Business School, The University of Manchester
*Lecturer in Management, Open University Business School, Walton Hall, Milton
Keynes MK7 6AA
B.Batiz@open.ac.uk
**NatWest Professor of Banking and Finance, Manchester Business School, Brooth





Technological innovation in general and information technology (IT) applications in
particular, have had a major effect in banking and finance. Following Garbade and
Silber (1978), this research reviews the effects on banking organisations with
reference to front office or external changes as described by the nature of product and
service offerings. Following Morris (1986) and Quintás (1991), the research also
considers innovations in the back office or internal (operational function) changes
brought about to banking organisations. Outstanding IT-based innovations are
considered and grouped into four distinct periods: early adoption (1864-1945),
specific application (1945-1965), emergence (1965-1980) and diffusion (1980-1995).
The research then discusses the potential impact of more recent innovations (i.e.
electronic purses, digital cash and Internet banking). As a result, the research provides
an historical perspective on the main drivers determining adoption of technological
innovation in retail banking markets.3
1. Introduction
Table 1 summarises two dimensions of technological progress in retail banking. These
dimensions describe the nature of change brought about by technological innovation
externally (product or service offerings) and internally (operational function) to
banking organisations. Although other dimensions might offer a more comprehensive
treatment of innovation in financial services, the dimensions portrayed below suffice
to provide an historical perspective on the adoption of technological innovation in
retail bank markets. Initially, change induced by innovations in information and
communications technologies (IT) reduced price differentials in geographically distant
markets. The next stage saw specific IT markets and then IT modified specific
applications that modified the relations between previously isolated departments of
banking organisations. Over time, IT applications produced alterations throughout the
whole organisational structure in terms of internal operations and with respect to
bank-client relationships. In brief, Table 1 outlines key technological innovations in
retail finance as grouped into four distinct periods: early adoptions, specific
application, emergence and diffusion.
Table 1: Dimensions of IT Innovation in Retail Banking, 1845-1995


























































Sources: Morris (1986) and Quintás (1991)
The dimensions of technological innovation in retail banking portray the internal
structure of banks as being determined by a combination of changes in banks’ external
environment and advances in information technology. Pugh (1973, p. 28) was one of4
the first contributions to document widespread empirical support on the effect on
organisations of the environment, relative to competitors’ size and technology.
According to this view, managers are passive in the adoption of the boundaries drawn
around their organisation, while the rate of adoption of new technology is contingent
on the organisation’s circumstances. However, empirical studies do recognise that
despite the limitations imposed by the context in which organisations perform,
managers have plenty of leeway to make their influence felt in the pursuit of
competitive advantage (idem). In other words, the research considers that managers of
banks have little influence over the development of technological innovation while,
simultaneously, the actions (or omissions) of managers in banking organisations in
adopting technology are considered critical to determine how technological
innovations modify competition in bank markets.
In what follows, the discussion of technological innovation that altered the provision
of financial services will cover external changes over methods of undertaking
transactions (between customers and bank) and changes up to the point at which
customers enter the banking system. The discussion will also cover technology-
induced changes in internal procedures. In particular, changes over operational
functions and process innovations are explored. These changes and innovations will
be identified as changes in:
• national payment systems (i.e. distribution of cash and coins between the central
bank and individuals rather than bank assets as substitutes for cash balances);
• the delivery of deposit lending and settlement transactions; and
• the storage and retrieval of accounting information.
The research, therefore, presents a summary of major IT-based innovations and an
analytical framework with which to structure an historical review of how IT
innovations were adopted in retail bank markets. The discussion will focus on how the
performance of retail banks changed through the applications of new information and
telecommunications technologies and resulted in product and operational (process)
improvements. This historical review defines participants in bank markets following
Klein (1971, p. 206), Baltensperger (1980, p. 1), Swank (1996, p. 193) and Radecki
(1998, p. 4). In other words, throughout the paper commercial banks are defined as5
financial intermediaries that accept deposits without explicit payment of interest (sight
accounts) and which create assets that are generally acceptable means of exchange
(paper and electronic payment instruments).
Alongside the general review of the absorption of IT innovations in banking,
particular attention will be given to IT innovation in United Kingdom (UK) bank
markets in general. The UK and England in particular, are used as the benchmark
because they have had a large and highly competitive wholesale banking markets, and
have preceded other developed countries in the introduction of changes regulating
financial markets (Bank of England, 1991). UK participants in bank markets also
seem to have adopted key technology innovations before counterparts in North
America (Bátiz-Lazo, 1998, p. 277). Focusing on the UK bank markets will also
provide an opportunity to explore whether technological change has enhanced the
importance of computer systems within the strategic compass of commercial banks.
Specifically, this research will determine whether the introduction of IT applications
supported changes in banks' strategic goals and modified the principal-agent
relationship between bank and customer, so that client-bank relations depended less
on subjective loyalty or service quality considerations (approached as idiosyncratic
investments) and more on current and prospective levels of financial margin.
The document proceeds as follows. The second section considers the effects of
outstanding IT-based technical innovations as grouped into four distinct periods
defined as early adoptions (1864-1945), specific application (1945-65), emergence
(1965-80) and diffusion (1980-98). In the third section the discussion turns to the
potential impact of more recent innovations in payment systems, the so called
‘electronic purses’ and Internet banking as well as their likely effects on competition
within bank markets. The fourth and final section discusses the implications of IT-
based change for the corporate strategy of commercial banks.
2. Information Technology Innovation and Banking
2.1. Early Adoption Period
i
The introduction of telecommunications into bank markets dates to 1846 when the
telegraph reduced stock price differentials between New York and regional stock
markets (Garbade and Silber, 1978, p. 823). The 1866 introduction of the trans-
Atlantic cable equally enabled greater integration of securities trading in New York6
and London (idem, p. 827). Greater integration took place as the completion of the
cable reduced the time delay to execute a trade in New York, which had been initiated
in London from six weeks to only one day. According to Garbade and Silber (1978),
early innovations such as the trans-Atlantic cable were accompanied by statistically
significant evidence that the introduction of primitive forms of telecommunication
substantially reduced or even eliminated foreign exchange and security price
differentials between geographically distinct markets.
However, evidence has yet to develop and support the possibility that market
integration increased or continued during the years that followed the emergence of
individual new communication innovations. Evidence in Garbade and Silber (1978)
suggests that new communication innovations represented (proportionally) smaller
reductions in price differentials. This evidence suggests that the adoption of telegraph
or telephone facilities primarily produced the same kind of information asymmetry
amongst market participants. However, greater use of telegraph or telephone facilities
also resulted in price related information becoming homogeneous by linking the head
office with branches in different domestic and international locations or by providing
dealers and banks with the same price information in a timely manner. It is no
surprise, then, that the statistical significance of the enhanced market integration was
greatest for early developments, that is, those financial transactions where information
delays were greatest prior to the introduction of telecommunication applications
(idem, p. 831).
The early introduction of telecommunications into bank markets did little to modify
front office procedures, that is, methods of conducting transactions between customers
and bank remain largely the same. For instance, the amalgamation process that swept
UK banking after the introduction of limited liability banking during the late
nineteenth century resulted in financial intermediaries with nationwide retail branch
networks. However, it was not until the 1950s that UK commercial banks actively
pursued the aim of becoming depository institutions for excess funds or began to
develop non-deposit products for mid-income customers (more below).
During the early adoption period, bank customers entered the banking system directly
through retail bank branches or indirectly through agency representatives (such as
savings banks, mortgage specialists and even retail outlets). Telephone conversations7
between bank managers and customers have been recorded in use as early as the
1890s, but, in spite of this, service remained largely unaffected by technology with the
front office relationship unchanged and controlled locally through asynchronous,
analogue systems such as paper-based records and pass-book control.
At the time, financial intermediaries observed little in the way of systematic product
and customer group diversification. The main function of the head office was to
manage and provide services such as cheque clearing, relations with the central bank
and to manage the bank’s liquidity and balance sheet through treasury operations.
Head office was also in charge of policing performance through financial control and
draconian inspection methods. Long-term relations of individual customers with the
bank retail branch were needed to secure services such as loans or establish credit
ratings and as a result, managers of retail bank branches were persons of independent
authority and standing in their local communities. Meanwhile, individual banks
performed international transactions such as clearing bills of exchange through
networks of correspondent banks abroad rather than through open markets.
During the late 1930s the first tabulating machines were purchased to address the
growing volume of transactions and enhance working conditions and productivity of
senior staff. This trend was reinforced through the purchase of additional adding and
listing machines that supported the growing network of branches and agents.
However, the potential of these machines, as well as punch-hole ‘accounting’
machines, as mechanisms for recording and updating transactions were not fully
exploited until after the late 1940s and early 1950s. Increasing the size of the branch
network and divesting under-performing agents then became a priority. Performance
indicators primarily measured growth in size (such as assets per employee and
investment referrals) rather than efficiency or effectiveness (such as financial
profitability and credit risk exposure). Moreover, during this period, financial
performance of the branch network and individual retail branches was examined only
at random and when specifically commissioned by the Board or the Finance
Committee.
The characteristic provision of financial services in retail markets was to change with
the commercial use of computer power. According to Locke (1999, p. 5) and Leslie
(2000, p. 49), the most important IT applications had their origins in US government-8
sponsored research in the first half of the twentieth century. Interactive IT applications
would never have existed without a long and expensive gestation period in which
computer power and telecommunication applications were devoted to help the US
gain the initiative in science and technology. Indeed, the British experience with
computer hardware development would tend to confirm Locke´s and Leslie’s view of
a defence-based technology push. The first stored-program computer in the world was
developed in 1948 by academics at Manchester University (Anonymous, 1998).
However, lack of funding resulted in Freddie Williams and Tom Kilburn being unable
to continue with their project. Government sponsored research in the US was
therefore the force behind the development of highly sophisticated hardware and
software as well as the networks which linked computers together.
In brief, early adoptions of telecommunications and computer applications had
greatest impact in organised high value wholesale bank markets, that is, those
activities that had traditionally been further away from volume transactions through
retail bank branches. Banks absorbed the new technology on the back of a growing
market for retail bank services, which expanded as middle income individuals became
a growing proportion of the population. However, it was government sponsored
research in the US rather than bank initiatives that provided the force behind the
original innovations that would result in interactive IT applications during the 1970s.
2.2. Specific Application Period
The second wave of IT innovation in retail finance begins in the late 1950s and lasted
up to the late 1960s. Banks introduced computers to keep up with growth in business
volume while, at the same time, solve very specific problems and automate existing
practices of specific departments (see further Seeger et al., 1974; Morris, 1986; BBC,
1995). The introduction of computer power relied on US-based suppliers of
accounting machines such as IBM, Xerox and Burroughs (later Univac and Unisys).
Initially, computer manufacturers responded quickly to the demand for hardware but
failed to make much concession to users’ software requirements (Fincham et al.,
1994, p. 153), or to recognise the new strategic possibilities reduced information costs
provided. The lack of ready-made software products forced user organisations to
devise their own solutions to this problem until high-level programming languages
emerged from joint collaboration of users and computer manufacturers (idem).9
At the time, banks aimed to develop the capacity to handle more complex and higher
level service tasks with their existing ‘high street’ skills and resources. This resulted
in the branch network quickly turning into the main point of contact with retail
customers while, internally, there was a growing need to supply top management with
prompt (i.e. quarterly) financial information. A process-directed automation thrust
dominated the specific application period and aimed at undercutting the cost of
administrative tasks such as the labour-intensive cheque clearing system. During this
period, the typical financial sector computer installation consisted of a central
mainframe (Fincham et al., 1994, p. 154), dedicated to sequential batch processing of
computer readable instructions dealing with separate processes such as providing a
service for handling customer transactions, standing orders and other clerical
procedures. Computer applications were therefore concentrated on back-office
operations (Morris, 1986, p. 77), because controlling a growing mountain of
paperwork provided the potential for economies of scale. There was also an incentive
to automate at the individual branch bank level and to improve market-wide
processes.
As mentioned previously, US-based providers of hardware solutions had achieved a
position of advantage from their head-start in the development of the first digital
computer in the 1940s. This position of advantage was maintained throughout
generous funding underwriting, the retrospectively somewhat illusory, technological
competition with the former Soviet Union during the 1950s and 1960s. The delay
before bank markets benefited from this new technology reflected the time needed for
US government-sponsored research programmes to produce a critical mass of skilled
IT professionals who were willing and able to get involved in commercial IT
applications (more below).
By 1965, most major banks in the US and UK had been introduced to electronic data
processing and many of them had seen the arrival of their first computer installation.
Towards the end of the decade, with the introduction of a second or third computer, a
major redistribution of organisational responsibilities followed. Organisational change
tried to solve the apparent paradox between greater efficiency associated with
automation (i.e. greater centralisation) and enhanced service offerings to customers
associated with devolution of discretion to customer facing staff at retail branches (i.e.10
greater decentralisation). Greater automation and improved communications, such as
automatic internal switchboards, resulted in the establishment of central accounting
units and in centralisation of customer account control so that regional and branch
managers lost autonomy to centralised senior managers. Centralisation on the back of
computer applications, therefore, created a space for a standardisation of service
offering and the potential to reduce cost structures of traditional activities.
The increasing complexity and volume of financial transactions eventually led to the
development of Database Management Systems or DBMS (Fincham et al., 1994, p.
154). The role of the DBMS was to overcome the limitations of conventional filing
systems by providing a generalised, structured and integrated body of data that could
be read and updated in a controlled, efficient, and reliable way (idem). Two key
applications built on DBMS and took place in 1968. First came an interbank voucher-
less payment facility called the Bankers’ Automated Clearing System or BACS
(Morris, 1986). The second innovation involved the installation of the National
Girobank, the automation of retail national and international money transfer through
forms handled by Post Office outlets (Thomson, 1968).
A payment clearing system had existed in London since the 1770s and was known as
the Banker's Clearing House (Bank of England, 1987, p. 392). The system emerged as
representatives of note-issuing banks met informally to exchange cheques drawn on
their various banks and to settle up by netting their positions and transferring money
between accounts at different branches and banks or from their account at the central
bank (e.g. Perry, 1975, p. 63). The system grew organically into a limited liability
company known as the Bankers' Clearing House Ltd. (established in 1864). The
company was owned and controlled by a group of banks called the ‘Committee of
London Clearing Banks’, and built upon banks that regarded the provision of current
account facilities and money transmission services as their core business (Cooper,
1984, p. 50).
By 1900 ten clearing banks captured 46 per cent of total deposits in England and
Wales and by the end of the first world war, five major clearing banks captured 97 per
cent of total deposits (Holmes and Green, 1986, p. 121). The number of major banks
remained stable during the next 50 years and in 1960 the system of clearing was
extended to credit transfers and standing orders of payment (Perry, 1975, p. 75).Non-11
members could also provide current account and other facilities but required members
(known as clearing banks) to act as agents to settle their cheques, transfers and
standing orders.
From 1967 to 1973, mergers reduced yet again the number of clearing banks. These
new institutions together with Midland Bank and Lloyds Bank were, at the time, the
five biggest retail banking groups in the UK. In 1975 the Co-operative Bank and the
Trustees Savings Bank (TSB) also became clearing banks and the National Girobank
joined them in 1983 (Bank of England, 1987, p. 392). More recent membership of
clearing facilities was issued to building societies turned banks such as Abbey
National in 1989.
Alongside changes in the membership of the clearing committee, clearing banks
established in 1968 their first computer-based intra-organisational network while
aiming to exploit the cost advantages of electronic data interchange or EDI. This
network emerged in the form of an electronic transfer system of payments (called
BACS) to which non-clearing banks could subscribe but again, only through a
clearing member acting as agent. The BACS system grew to be the world's largest
automated clearing house, with a total staff of approximately 200 handling 262
million items by 1976 (Cooper, 1984, p. 53). The development of BACS created an
interbank facility in an attempt to bring under control rising costs associated with the
huge growth of cheque transactions during economic life-style improvement in the
post-war recovery years (Gardener and Molyneux, 1990, p. 84). In 1967, the National
Board for Prices and Income reported on bank changes and recommended various
ways for increased competition. Following legislation introduced after the 1967
review of banking, from 1972 onwards BACS also aimed to create new sources of
bank business by moving wage payment away from cash and into bank accounts
(Price Commission, 1978, p. 33).
A second key development in the UK during the specific application period was the
establishment of the National Giro Centre (later Girobank) in 1968. Girobank
introduced another important innovation in the British money transmission system.
Girobank was the first full computer-centred financial intermediary (Thomson, 1968,
p. ix). Its original purpose was to help update the Post Office by making them the12
distribution channel for low cost transactions (Girobank, 1993), that is, offering a
money transmission service through 21,000 post offices in the UK.
Internationally, the UK was a latecomer to this service. Austria pioneered postal giro
in 1883 and automated giro systems in 1962 (Thomson, 1968, p. 209). In the UK
version of the giro system it was possible to maintain current accounts and by 1977
Girobank attracted 580,000 customers all but 30,000 of whom were individuals,
representing about 3 per cent of the personal account banking market (Price
Commission, 1978, p. 45). Developments in the UK, however, were below
expectations. It was readily recognised that external factors had little influence on
Girobank’s slow penetration of the personal market (idem, p. 46). This was because
Girobank tended to rely on recruiting Post Office personnel, most lacking the
professional skills of the banking sector. A complex system that resulted in higher
than average tariffs for money transmission was also mentioned as contributing factor.
Nonetheless, the UK’s Girobank was a sign of things to come with regards to:
• Its specialisation in terms of activity (money transfer) and market segment (low
income banking and benefit payment);
• Its creation of an alternative retail money transfer system utilising an existing non-
dedicated distribution channel already in place (Post Office counters);
• The competitive challenge it offered through focussed operations that lowered cost
to process payment orders and bank cheques (internal allocation to process postal
payment orders and bank cheques was 12 and 20 per cent, respectively).
Succinctly, during the specific application period computer-based applications emerge
and take place in isolated departments of the banking firm. During this period the first
IT applications in the bank-client transactions were introduced. Enhanced computer
power allowed banks to process the growing volume of paper-based transactions in
central locations with the added effect of modified labour costs. This would suggest
that greater use of IT applications in banking reinforced the hierarchical and volume
driven ethos of financial intermediaries serving retail markets while promising
product diversification on the back of standardised service offerings and reduced cost
structures. At the same time, computer power enabled managers of banks to look for
more standardised (and cheaper) labour while a new set of IT-related capabilities13
began to emerge as a necessary condition for competition in bank markets (Quintás,
1991 and Fincham et al., 1994).
2.3. Emergence Period
The third wave of IT innovations in retail finance emerged hand in hand with
advances in telecommunications. During the emergence period, banks became one of
the world's dominant customers for computer-based applications, far exceeding other
sectors such as capital goods manufacturers or transportation (Scherer, 1982; Quintás,
1991). Between 1968 and 1980 banks emerged as major customers of software and
hardware as they became involved in applications which delivered significant cost
reductions as well as increased business volume and variety. The main difference
between this and the specific application period was that the impact of computers was
felt throughout the organisation rather than in specific departments. The ability to
achieve higher quality and lower cost in an unprecedented way established large scale-
economies in banking which were not offset by organisational discontinuities (see
further Walker, 1978).
Developments in hardware and software that found their applications in the private
sector in general and in banking in particular, were further enhanced with the
reduction of government expenditure that had supported the space exploration project.
As a result, throughout the 1970s many highly qualified individuals formerly working
at NASA found employment in investment banks and the treasury operations of US-
based commercial banks. Changes were also observed in the recruitment strategies of
banks outside of North America. In the UK, highly skilled university graduates were
attracted and prepared for future responsibilities as senior staff at banks and non-bank
financial intermediaries. This was a departure from the traditional practice of ‘internal
job markets’ developed in the 1920s, that is, the recruitment and in-house training of
low-skilled and risk adverse individuals, who had few ambitions beyond the security
of job ‘for life’ employment offered by banks and would require little motivation
(Parker, 1981, p. 147).
Early adoption of EDI in the UK as well as the change in recruiting practices were
critical to secure the pre-eminence of London-based banks throughout the growth of
euro-currency and euro-bond markets. In the Euromarket banks accept deposits and
issue loans denominated in currencies other than that of their country of origin.14
Through Euromarket transactions participants minimise their exposure to sovereign
risk and, in the process, segregate that exposure from currency risk.
Euromarkets date to the post-war years when surplus pools of dollar denominated
funds emerge related to significant balance of payments deficits between the US and
Europe, trade with East-Block countries and the cap on the level of US domestic
interest rates (Regulation Q). The Bank of England’s encouragement for London-
based banks financing of multinational companies was also important. In June of 1963
the first eurobond issue was launched, signalling the re-birth of London as a major
centre for international finance. The event also marked the beginning of the
Euromarkets because both sides of the market (currencies and financing) became
active in a single transaction.
During the 1970s, the growth of the Euromarket was fuelled by the demise of fixed
exchange rates to the dollar, excess liquidity in oil exporting countries and the
emergence of a secondary market in Eurobond issues. The creation and development
of a secondary Euromarket gave depth and liquidity to any placement, standardised
dealing practices and promoted transparent pricing guidelines. By the mid-1970s the
Euromarkets were firmly established. Absence of a governing body resulted in rates
and volumes fluctuating according to issuer needs and lender disposition, producing a
free and boundary-less market. Euromarkets were thus situated as the pre-eminent
market to place great-volume funds, as a response to the increasing integration of
world trade.
Information technology and innovations in telecommunications helped to achieve
greater use of the Euromarkets by actively reducing the cost of placements, reducing
the distance between syndicates, issuers, lenders and the secondary market; as well as
through improvements in banks trading rooms and back-offices. IT-led innovation
was thus critical to re-incorporate transactions in other financial centres (more below).
Other distinctive characteristics of banking organisations during the emergence period
included the introduction of full automation to branch accounting, real time operation
and control of branches by the central office. In the UK, Clydesdale Bank was the first
to network every teller and cashier position, that is, to provide the possibility for each
transaction to have direct access to the bank’s on-line transaction-processing services
(Fincham et al., 1994, p. 154-5). Concisely, the immediate result of innovations15
during this period was that customers were able to bank at any point in the retail
branch network while the previous arrangement limited several transactions to the
customer’s own branch. Indeed, the regional manager for a major UK provider
reported at the time that:
‘…the [bank’s] computer will provide to all branches an “on-line” enquiry
service. Account balances and redemption figures will be immediately
available ensuring a much speedier service to members and professional
contacts.’
ii
Panel A in Table 2 illustrates the growth of one of the most successful applications
that emerged during this period. It took place in 1967 when Barclays Bank (UK)
introduced the first Automated Teller Machine (ATM) in the world (Barclays, 1982),
while IBM introduced the magnetic stripe plastic cards in 1969 (Bátiz-Lazo et al.,
2001, p. 867). Together these innovations marked the birth of electronic banking.
Table 2: Growth of ATMs in the UK and elsewhere, 1974-1995






Source: Collett and Maher (1997)
Panel B: Cash Dispensers and ATMs in Four OECD Countries, 1988-1995
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Number of machines per million inhabitants:
Belgium 85 92 94 105 109 119 313 360
France 206 231 255 284 305 325 356 395
UK 245 275 296 314 324 328 342 358
US 296 306 321 331 342 367 418 467
Number of transactions per inhabitant:
Belgium 5.7 6.8 7.1 8.1 8.8 9.1 11.9 14.2
France 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 12.0 13.3 14.2 15.7
UK 13.2 15.4 17.3 18.8 20.2 21.3 22.9 25.2
US 18.4 20.6 23.2 25.3 28.2 29.8 31.8 36.9
Average value of transactions (USD)
*:
Belgium 94.4 94.2 113.2 117.4 113.2 110.3 125.2 137.5
France 75.3 72.3 81.4 83.4 95.5 77.0 76.5 81.3
UK 68.0 65.0 77.0 81.0 84.6 72.5 74.6 77.3
US 66.0 64.7 66.0 67.0 66.9 68.2 67.2 67.7
*Converted at yearly average exchange rates Sources: Bank for International Settlements (1989, 1996)16
Barclays introduced credit cards to the UK by importing systems (including computer
applications) from Bank of America (US) at the end of 1965 (Bátiz-Lazo et al., 2001,
p. 865). Barclay’s early adoption of ATMs was no coincidence because cash
withdrawal through ATMs is a major use for credit cards. Indeed, the emergence of
the ATM marked the beginning of self-service banking as services provided by the
bank teller could be performed on a 24-hour schedule and at the customers'
convenience rather than during banking hours. Panel B in Table 2 shows how ATMs
expanded rapidly in the UK and elsewhere as other institutions followed Barclays'
lead. By 1974 there were 3,140 cash dispensing machines in the US, owned by 534
banks (Walker, 1978, p. 68). More recently, according to 1990 figures, the UK had
some 294 ATMs per million inhabitants (Maudos and Pastor, 1995, p. 8).
Noticeable changes in bank internal organisation started to take place alongside the
growth in ATM adoption complementing retail bank branch distribution. Initially the
heavy investment required to build an ATM network was seen as a major source of
competitive advantage for large banks, so interconnection was slow to develop.
However, managers of banks eventually realised that few financial organisations had
access to the financial resources and IT skills to develop widespread ATM networks.
Banks then increasingly sought critical mass through strategic alliances.
For example, the Co-operative Bank was notoriously slow to introduce ‘on-line’
systems. Only in 1987 was the bank able to offer on-line banking rather than the pass-
book system through its agencies in Co-operative stores. To solve the IT problem, the
Co-operative Bank pursued several collaborative solutions. One was to become a
founding member of the LINK Group in 1984. The bank had 50 ATMs in its 78
branches but, through LINK, bank customers could access around 400 ATMs. This
number grew to 1,000 in 1988 and then to 3,500 when the Matrix Group joined LINK
(also in 1988). By 1995, LINK allowed access to over 8,500 ATMs in the UK alone,
with the Co-operative Bank contributing 119 ATMs (managed by IBM under a £13
million outsourcing contract signed in 1994). Hence, 30 years after the introduction of
the first ATM, the absurdity of terminals connected to different networks located side
by side and long after terminal density had reached saturation point, eventually
resulted in a single interconnected network in 1999 for the UK (Bátiz-Lazo et al.,
2001, p. 865).17
During the emergence period, the introduction of management information systems or
MIS also took place (Fincham et al., 1994, p. 155). These systems initially aimed to
use the computational power of transaction-processing capabilities to provide regular
reports and analyses of business activity. In this way MIS offered managers of banks
the possibility to increase the scope for monitoring, controlling and planning of
operational procedures. Although MIS increased line management productivity, MIS
systems proliferated throughout the organisation but without any fundamental change
in the nature of managers’ activities (idem).
In summary, during the emergence period technological change spread to many
internal aspects of the banking organisation and permeated bank-client relationships.
These changes started to modify how, when and where customers could enter the
banking system but banks had yet to be considered multi-delivery channel
organisations in their service offering or in their ability to direct all their information
to any point of customer contact. It is during this period that the convergence of
telecommunications and computer power resulted in true IT applications as the
emphasis of technological innovations shifted from data processing to
communications. At the same time, cost effective supply of financial services rather
than customer value creation continued to predominate the design of banks' internal
organisation and strategy development.
2.4. Diffusion Period
The diffusion period of the information revolution in commercial banking saw the
spread, within organised markets, of new and powerful applications developed to
handle the security required by high-volume payments. IT-related change became
critical to support unprecedented increase in the speed, quantity and quality of
information about cross-border transactions in organised markets such as those taking
place in the Euromarkets. Reforms in the US during the mid-1970s effectively
allowed US-based off-shore activities and by end of the decade New York regained its
position as a significant international market place. The 1980s also saw the emergence
of Tokyo, Hong Kong, Bahrain, Nassau and Singapore as secondary financial centres
specialising in non-European-currency denominated bonds like Australian dollars and
Korean wons.18
A very important event for organised markets is the lending crisis in the less
developed countries (LDC-debt), which originated between 1978 and 1982. Firstly,
banks were forced to make substantial provisions against bad debts, triggering the
need for banks to become more selective in lending and forcing regulatory authorities
to re-examine capital adequacy levels. Secondly, big non-bank corporations based in
industrialised nations found themselves with better credit ratings than banks which, in
turn, allowed them to finance directly from markets rather than through traditional
intermediaries (bank disintermediation). Banks were pleased to arrange this process
since it eliminated a burden on their capital. At the same time, in emerging and non-
industrialised Western economies governments turned to domestic debt markets to
finance the increasingly burdensome service of foreign debt.
The result of these processes was tremendous growth (in terms of issues and
financing) of organised markets. According to Hayes and Hubbard (1990), between
1965 and 1967 lead managers in Eurobond markets placed an average of 10 issues per
annum (each of $300 million dollars approximately). By 1976-1978 lead managers
placed an average of 70 eurobond issues per annum (equivalent to approximately
$3,000 million dollars). Between 1982 and 1986 lead managers had an annual average
of 500 issues, each valued around $ 40,000 million dollars.
Meanwhile, the most important consequence of the drive towards mass delivery of
retail financial services during the diffusion period was that banks effectively moved
from being places of decentralised personal relationships to ones run by institutional
managers
iii. During the diffusion period, the information revolution in commercial
banking saw the spread of IT to all aspects of banks' internal organisation and market
relationships thanks to the introduction of personal computers (PCs) in clerical and
managerial roles. During this period, consumer-oriented innovations were widespread
as information technology provided support to all points of contact between customers
and bank, prompted by major overhauls of incompatible legacy systems undertaken in
response to the perceptions of a major Y2K threat. PCs offered a flexible way of
providing and enhancing computer resources for a wide range of applications.
Simultaneously, widely available packaged software reduced the need to devote in-
house resources for the development of general application systems. Incorporating,
standardising and exploiting IT-based innovations became a key issue in banks' long-19
term strategies. Moreover, IT applications offered banks greater anticipated advantage
thanks to expectations of enhanced control of financial and strategic resources.
During the diffusion period, banks began to create relationship databases instead of
using skilled personnel at all points of contact with customers (BBC, 1995). For
example, Lesley Taylor (Head of Direct Banking, Royal Bank of Scotland) claimed
that current technology allowed one person to develop in 3 or 4 weeks the skills that
previously required 5 years in the job (BBC, 1995; Morris, 1986, p. 97). Information
technology applications, therefore, promised higher organisational flexibility to those
banks that could effectively implement technical changes.
The second effect of technical innovations on banks' approach to business during the
diffusion period pertained to distribution capabilities. The branch network reduced its
importance as the point-of-sale for financial services. This development was
facilitated with the advent of digital communications technologies and networks,
which allowed the performance and reliability required for organisation-wide
integration of data resources as well as more effective extra-organisational networks.
The integration of services around digital networks (ISDN) and greater use of
electronic data interchange (EDI) protocols were at the heart of new distribution
channels such as electronic fund at point of sale terminals (EFTPOS), telephone
transfer systems and smart cards. Card technology evolved to provide individual
customers with border-less services, primarily under the trademarks of VISA and
MasterCard International networks.
New distribution channels allowed banks to supply more services and this had
dramatic effects in banks' cost structures. For example, Bauer (1995, p. 94) claims that
by emphasising IT systems Citibank (New York) was able to serve 85 per cent of its
customers by telephone and electronically. For Citibank, automation represented
lowering the overall cost rate from 70 per cent to 55 per cent with announced
reductions of 30 per cent in branch staff costs (idem, p. 95). The move from more to
less expensive distribution channels was possible because the same information or
transaction could be delivered in a number of ways. However, cheaper processes were
an insufficient condition for reduced cost structures. For instance, providing an
account's balance costs less through an ATM than at the teller but only if the total
volume of requested balances remains unchanged will the total cost of ATM-supplied20
balances be less than that provided through branches. Technology, therefore, opened
the way for banks to improve their cost structures provided customers changed their
behaviour according to banks' expectations. Table 3 illustrates the growth in the
adoption of point of sale terminals and in turn, this growth reflected how IT
applications were used instead of cash registers and telephone credit authorisations.
Other innovations included cheque verification terminals and fund transfer terminals.
Table 3: Growth of EFTPOS Terminals in Four OCDE Countries, 1988-1995
(Number of terminals per million inhabitants)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Country
Belgium 1,925 2,477 2,828 3,213 4,034 5,246 6,294 7,174
France 2,154 2,842 3,180 3,568 5,594 7,435 7,574 9,394
UK 426 1,311 1,916 3,299 3,806 4,639 5,993 8,647
US 183 200 240 348 450 759 1,440 2,107
Source: Bank for International Settlements (1989, 1996)
Nevertheless, not all substitutes of the bank branch enjoyed the same success
(McNamara and Bromley, 1997). For example, growth of the most sophisticated
EFTPOS terminals was hampered by conflicts between retailers and banks about the
inadequacy of cash and cheques. A related issue was who should receive the ‘lion's
share’ of the profit. As a result, by the end of the 1980s, EFTPOS had yet to fulfil its
potential and develop into a major new source of profit for banks' fee income (e.g.
Wood, 1989, p. 3; Channon, 1988, p. 317).
All types of financial institutions invested heavily in the integration and
standardisation of internal systems during the 1980s. Progress, however, was uneven
because banks had traditionally operated through their own closely controlled retail
branch networks while the use of second and third parties as distributors was more
popular in the building society or insurance sectors. At the same time, high transaction
costs resulted in low international interconnectivity of payment systems. The
established framework handled urgent high value payment well, but achieving
potential economies of scale in small payments was deterred by some countries
lagging in the use of automated clearing systems, regulation or concentration in bank
markets (Wood and Erturk, 1996, pp. 15-16).21
In brief, during the diffusion period IT applications resulted in customers acquiring
several options when engaging in financial transactions with their main bank but also
competing banks. Together with regulatory change and theoretical advances to price
risk, technological innovations put a premium on financial information rather than on
banking on a set of transaction processing capabilities. Developments in IT were
instrumental in lowering entry barriers to bank markets by providing scale benefits to
the smallest providers. Applications of information technology also threatened to turn
retail bank branch networks into sunk (i.e. irrecoverable) strategic costs. During this
period IT developments augmented the range of financial services and product
availability by increasing the threat of substitution and by lowering the cost of
imitation. Moreover, during the diffusion period, digitisation and standardisation of IT
applications helped to explain the development of markets for second and third party
processing. Unfortunately, most potential opportunities opened by technology were
slow to develop because, although technology allowed new entrants to contest
markets for financial services, these challenges took place only in the most profitable
segments of bank markets (such as credit cards or unsecured lending).
3. Historical Experience and the Most Recent Applications
3.1. Technological Innovation and New Competitors
New technology allowed the introduction of new services and in turn, new retail bank
products brought the bank service away from the branch and closer to the customers
by delivering customer information at the point of sale. Banks had no proprietary hold
on this technology and at the same time, retailers started to offer their own credit
services with store payment (account) cards and credit cards. A classic example of an
originally non-financial firm offering financial mediation services was the experience
of Sears, Roebuck & Company (see further Ghemawat, 1984 or Christiansen, 1987).
In 1982 the US-based firm was the world's largest retailer (Ballarín, 1985, p. 117). As
part of its diversification strategy, Sears purchased an investment house (Dean Witter
Reynolds) and a real estate broker (Coldwell Banker). Sears tried to provide full
financial services through in-store sites (called Sears Financial Centres) by pulling
together its new acquisitions with previous finance business including own-brand
credit card (Discover Card) and insurance (Allstate Insurance Co., established in
1931).22
The company expected synergy to arise from developing products in one business and
selling them in another and from sharing customer information and administration,
floor space in stores, training programs, costs in communications and data processing.
In other words, Sears tried to create a one-stop department store by integrating:
• different retail sales and financial services
• customer support of sales in volume-oriented financial markets
• the strong brand name of Sears, and
• Sears' corporate culture.
However, by 1984 outsiders began voicing doubts about the strategy (Ballarín, 1985,
p. 122). The expected synergy had not materialised while the core retail operation had
lost competitiveness and market share. At the end of 1992, Sears with 824 department
and storage outlets, lost a record US$160 million dollars and was short of the annual
15 per cent return on equity (ROE) goal. As a result in June 1993, the financial-
services group was sold piecemeal for a total of US$4 billion dollars. The divestiture
provided Sears with much needed debt relief, reducing its outstanding debt to US$17
billion dollars
vi.
The divestiture of the finance side ended Sears’ attempt to capture financial products
with retailing. It could be argued that Sears was making the same mistake as banks by
delivering exclusively through branches (Crane and Bodie, 1996, p. 115).
Alternatively, it could be argued that conflicts in corporate culture were a barrier to
synergy (Ballarín, 1985, p. 122). However, either explanation was challenged by the
success of a more focused approach to retail finance by retailers like Marks and
Spencer or by the synergies with branches and supermarket stores explored by US
banks like Wells Fargo or Banc One (Channon, 1996, p. 5). In other words, despite its
failure to consolidate, Sears' case was the first attempt to achieve a supermarket in
financial services and the prime example for the blurring demarcations in the
functions of banks and non-financial intermediaries. Moreover, Sears' entry strategy
was not necessarily that of a price cutter. Instead, Sears' managers expected synergy to
develop by building financial services around an established customer base.
In brief, technology has provided several alternatives for customers to enter the
banking system. But at the same time, banks lack sole property rights over the most23
important IT developments while internal IT expertise varies widely from one
organisation to the other (Fincham et al., 1994, pp. 155-6). A direct consequence of
banks lacking property rights over IT innovations is the successful entry of non-
finance providers to bank markets. Information technology applications have allowed
non-finance providers that abide to detailed regulatory schemes to supply financial
services while exhibiting a low-cost structure relative to established participants in
bank markets (Channon, 1988, p. 359). In other words, actual and potential
competition of non-finance providers would suggest how low sustainability of
competitive advantage for banks' ‘traditional’ distribution strategies and low or no
creation of competitive advantage to banks’ widespread use of IT in developing new
distribution channels.
3.2. Telephone-Based Delivery of Retail Financial Services
If Sears represented an attempt at early broad-spectrum distribution strategies during
the late 1980s and early 1990s, the most successful new delivery channels for
financial services happened in telephone banking operations. Telephone banking
evolved to complement ATM networks and physical branches. Telephone banking
created a multi-channel distribution system for banks based on an integrated customer
account and information system (Gardener, 1995, p. 4).
Distributing retail financial services through the telephone was unsuccessfully
pioneered in 1979 by Banc One Corp. of Ohio, USA (Myers and Kanter, 1989, p. 3).
Despite Bank One’s experience, phone-banking pilot schemes continued and by 1982
telephone transfer systems operated in a small number of Californian banks (Channon,
1986, p. 387). In 1984, Sanwa Bank (Japan) received 40 per cent of deposits and
performed 70 per cent of card transactions through full on-line banking services
(idem, p. 312). At that time, Sanwa was also developing push-button telephone
interfaces (op.cit.).
In 1986, The Bank of Scotland and Nottingham Building Society jointly introduced
the first major telephone banking system in Britain (Hughes, 1994, p. 36). The system
(called HOBS) aimed at home and office banking. HOBS was swiftly followed by
TSB’s Speedlink system in 1987. A more advanced version of these systems was
developed in October 1989, when Midland Bank established a 24-hour telephone24
service under the separate identity of First Direct. This was the first British phone-
based, branch-less retail bank.
Since 1989, the proportion of transactions over the phone has grown to a considerable
share of total transactions. In the US, transactions represented 24 per cent of total
transactions in 1995
vii. However, customers in European countries prefer other forms
of retail finance services as in 1995 telephone-based transactions represented 4 per
cent of total transactions in the UK, 3 per cent in Sweden, 2 per cent in Germany and
1.5 per cent in France
viii.
A recent survey by Holmsen et al. (1998) confirmed the growing trend of the use of
alternative distribution channels as a percentage of total transactions. New distribution
alternatives have reduced the importance of the bank retail branch as the main point of
contact for sales, service and relationship management. Reduced importance of
‘traditional’ bank distribution was evident as 18 per cent of retail bank customers in
Canada and the US used electronic only means to contact their bank, 61 per cent of
those customers used more than one channel and 21 per cent used only the bank
branch (idem, p. 84). Of those customers that used more than one channel, 46 per cent
relied in combinations chiefly involving ATMs, 28 per cent the bank branch, 20 per
cent the telephone, 3 per cent postal deposits and 3 per cent PC-based applications
such as electronic commerce (op.cit).
The result of greater importance of IT applications in all aspects of the way banks add
value has questioned how bank managers would account for customer revenues. In
particular, bank managers have had to address tough operational issues to measure the
individual profitability of customer segments, product/service lines and distribution
channels.
Allocating strict accountability standards would imply tracking key economic drivers
for individual distribution channels, service/product offerings, customer group and
individual customers. According to Bátiz-Lazo and Wood (1999, p. 24), bank
managers would expect software and hardware developments to enable them to
achieve close control of the main profitability drivers. This as only a handful of banks
in the world posses IT applications that provide detailed profitability reports (Holmsen
et al., 1998, p. 85). In the meantime, most managers at commercial banks seem to
prefer withstanding an element of cross-subsidisation because of its associated25
stability (Bátiz-Lazo and Wood, 1999, p. 25). As a result, it is likely that most banks
continue to allocate individual customer profitability to the retail bank branch or the
product/service line regardless of the channels actually used by that customer.
Succinctly, alternative distribution channels to the retail bank branch have attained a
considerable share of total transactions. The effect of this type of change has forced
managers at commercial banks to evaluate new organisational structures and resolve
operational issues in terms of individual customer risk and profitability. However, the
move away from the branch-centred organisation will require new IT applications.
Another challenge to managers of banks will be the development of the right mix of
acquired and internally grown IT applications. Hardware and software are expected to
provide the platform that will improve banks' multi-channel management while
reducing the cost of co-ordination. But at present, it is uncertain whether the solution
to banks' operational problem will result in
• no-change for the banking organisation;
• the creation of networks of stand alone product/service groups, stand alone
distribution channels and stand alone treasury operations; or
• a combination that allows product/service and channel managers to negotiate deals
independently.
3.3. Emergence of Smart Cards
The establishment of so called ‘electronic cash’ facilities have been the latest major IT
development in bank markets. The main difference between e-cash and previous
applications is the possibility for individuals to engage in economic transactions but
without recourse or claim over bank liabilities. Smart cards are the latest stage in the
evolution in the use of plastic cards. Smart cards (e.g. Mondex and Visa Cash) and
some applications of electronic commerce over the Internet are innovations that have
emerged as means of payment and the substitution of notes and coins issued by central
banks by electronic data interchange applications.
The first British credit card was established in 1965 after the proven success of credit
cards in the US (Scholes, 1984, p. 746). Barclays Bank established a wholly owned
subsidiary named Barclaycard which introduced a card of the same name. The launch
of Barclaycard allowed individuals to purchase in retail outlets with plastic cards26
instead of cash or cheques. Retail outlets would cash their receipts through an
intermediary (merchant acquirer) who, in turn, is reimbursed by the card issuer (e.g.,
Barclaycard). The card issuer then immediately transfers the balance to the current
account of the individual cardholder (debit card) or requests payment for the
accumulated balance at the end of the month (credit card).
Credit cards would enhance the convenience of retailers and individuals. Convenience
increased because cards offered more stable value than cheques (which are easier to
forge or risk failure because of insufficient funds) and are more portable than cash
(i.e., higher value to bulk ratio). Cards did not and have not displaced bank issued
money for two reasons. First, because card-based transactions involve the payment of
commissions to both the merchant acquirer and the card issuer. This payment typically
involves a percentage of the transaction's value and thus, introduced the need for a
minimum transaction value so card payments would be cost effective for card issuers.
Secondly, card receipts are redeemable only by the merchant acquirer or the card
issuer rather than payable on demand.
As mentioned above, an added characteristic of credit cards was a magnetic stripe
which provided electronic means of supplying card details. Magnetic stripes would
contain information for verification of cardholders' personal identification through an
‘off-line’ transaction by a card-reading terminal. During the 1980s credit card
transactions evolved to allow the transaction to finalise at the point of sale through
EFTPOS terminals. This innovation encompassed a direct link (i.e., ‘on line’) or
telephone link between the card-reading terminal and the bank. From very early on,
however, the magnetic stripe would allow individuals to use cards as entry points to
the banking system through ATMs.
In 1973 an alternative developed to a direct link between the credit card transaction
and the bank. Roland Moreno designed a plastic card with integrated circuit
technology (i.e., a microchip) instead of a magnetic stripe (Tomkin and Baden Fuller,
1998, p. 2). This was the first ‘smart card’ as the microchip could store much more
information than the magnetic stripe. Full exploitation of smart card technology
started in 1982 when Mr. Moreno persuaded France Telecom to introduce prepaid
telephone cards using smart card technology (idem). The French government
sponsored initial trials and by 1985 smart card technology was available in public27
telephones. Smart cards became widespread only after the cost of individual cards fell
from FFr125.00 in 1982 to FFr 15.00 in 1988 and the equipment to read information
from the card became small and manageable (op.cit.).
According to Stuber (1996, p. 3), the production cost of magnetic stripe cards can be
as low as 30 Canadian cents while the cost of the card reader is above $450.00
Canadian dollars (approximately FFr90.00 or £190.00 sterling at 1999 exchange
rates). At the same time, the manufacturing of multifunction smart cards starts at
$4.00 Canadian dollars while the cost of single-purpose payment cards equals $2.00
Canadian dollars. Moreover, the normal life of smart cards averages five years as
compared with two and half years for magnetic stripe cards. However, it was expected
that common use of smart cards would bring scale benefits and hence, reduce the unit
cost of smart cards and its card-reading technology.
3.4. Smart Cards and Electronic Cash
The potential cost effectiveness of smart cards was one of the incentives for payment
managers at NatWest Bank (UK) to develop a multi-purpose, prepaid smart card
(Tomkin and Baden Fuller, 1998, p. 3). Tim Jones and Graham Higgins initially
designed a prepaid card with enhanced protection against fraud which, at the same
time, resulted in a cost effective alternative to account for individual transactions. In
1988 a card was developed under the name of ‘Red Switch’ project. This card
facilitated a variety of small-value retail transactions but it was a card that could also
be a substitute for central bank issued notes and coins.
What formally is known as the Mondex card involves monetary value to be loaded
onto the card with a corresponding debit to the cardholder at a point of entry to the
banking system (i.e., retail branch, ATM or purposely build devices). In a retail
transaction, monetary value would be transferred from the purchaser's card into the
merchant's terminal in an off-line mode. The value of consumer purchases would then
accumulate in the merchant's terminal and would be transferred to the merchant's
account at a financial institution from time to time through on-line transactions.
Uniquely the Mondex system permitted fund transfers to remain anonymous and
monetary value to be stored in any up to five separate currencies. More importantly,
some card holders could choose to acquire an electronic Mondex wallet so that28
monetary value could be transferred between cards without passing through a
financial intermediary.
The Mondex project required NatWest to invest an accumulated £2 million pounds by
1992. In this process the NatWest team worked closely with no less than four major
Japanese electronic firms to develop card and peripheral components. NatWest also
engaged in strategic alliances to exploit the product commercially. In 1992 British
Telecom (BT) joined with the given advantage of being the largest provider of
telephone equipment and telecommunication services in the UK. BT had also worked
with NatWest in previous projects while being one of NatWest's largest customers
(Tomkin and Baden Fuller, 1998, p. 3). Also in 1992, Midland Bank joined Mondex
as there was also a history of working with NatWest on the development of other card
products and shared ATM networks.
The alliance increased the scale of potential applications for the Mondex card and
allowed participants to share a £50 million sterling investment over the next three
years. Thus, in 1995 a two year trial run was launched in Swindon (a town in the
South of England). This pilot trial involved converting ATMs and telephones to
enable monetary value being recharged onto the Mondex card as well as providing
card-reading technology to outlets such as retailers, buses, petrol stations, etc. 30 per
cent of the 40,000 strong target customer base at Swindon adopted Mondex
technology while 70 per cent of targeted retail outlets were converted. Table 4
suggests that the apparent initial success of Mondex provided the incentives for other
banks, technology specialists, local governments, postal delivery services and
telephone companies to engage in tests of advanced card technology. In the following
years banks, non-banks and non-finance companies launched several pilot projects in
almost all regions of the world (although, some with disappointing results).
The Mondex project, although still young, suggested that e-cash technology had
customer appeal. Profit opportunities related to offering a better proposition than
central bank issued notes and coins. Cash currency, however, remained the cheapest,
simplest and quickest current means of making low monetary value payments. Hence,
e-cash technology seems likelier to succeed by drawing on:
• unattended locations (such as telephones, transport, vending, etc where operational
savings are high and customer benefits evident);29
• customer segments who do not have a plastic card but desire one;
• closed schemes with multiple functions (such as university campus cards or social
security payments); and supporting infrastructure of electronic commerce (this
assuming e-commerce develops to support a significant proportion of total
economic transactions).
Table 4: Selection of Consumers Tests for the Acceptance of E-Cash, 1995-1996
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Source: Stuber (1996) and own estimates.
The final success of the Mondex alternative relied on making e-cash almost as widely
accepted as central bank issued notes and coins. This means that consumers will not
be prepared to pay much for the facility, especially as notes and coins are perceived to
have very low transaction costs. At the same time, retailers and merchants would
expect a payment mechanism that is cheaper than existing arrangements.
The potential commercial weakness of Mondex produced a competitor network which
displaced central bank issued notes and coins. In late 1997 a pilot project was
launched in Leeds (a city in the North of England) by Visa International and called
‘Visa Cash’. This project developed through an alliance with ZKA and Semerpa30
(Financial Times, 23 June 1998). ZKA is the German parent of Geldkarte or
Germany's most widely accepted credit card. Semerpa is a joint venture in Spain with
the Confederation of Spanish Savings Banks (i.e., CECA).
The Visa Cash initiative aimed at improving the interoperability of established
‘electronic purses’, that is, smart card technology through which retailers can only
redeem accumulated monetary balances with a financial institution. The Visa Cash
project seeks to develop a standard by bringing together the functional requirements of
a centrally-accounted system. The potential benefits of Visa Cash emerge from
linking systems that are already in place with the added benefit of low risk of
disintermediation for commercial and central banks. The potential weakness is that
Visa Cash remains a pre-authorised debit card rather than a card which allows
individuals to exchange monetary value directly and without reference to balances in
financial institutions.
In summary, previous IT developments succeeded to the extent that customer
convenience was enhanced by introducing new ways to make payments. Securing the
acceptance of retailers, merchants and other outlets will be key for e-cash technology
to develop. Equally important will be for individuals to change their purchasing
patterns and meet banks' expected consumer behaviour. At the same time, the
challenge for e-cash applications such as Mondex, Visa Cash and some types of e-
commerce over the Internet will be to establish widespread adoption of new ways of
making payments. In particular, payment systems free of bank deposit transfers. E-
cash, therefore, has the potential of re-introducing individual bank notes as it can be
privately issued currency.
3.5. Increasing the Service Offer
Table 5 summarises some of the most important recent IT applications in retail
finance markets, namely ATMs, telephone banking and ‘electronic’ banking. Partial
success of most of these applications questions whether technological change in the
Digital Age
iv (as opposed to those in the Information Age
v) offers new forms of
competition and business models in bank markets. On the one hand, commercial
banks have coped with technological innovation and accomplished managers'
intended objectives with varying success. Technology has opened the way for banks to
improve their cost structures provided they could induce customers to change their31
behaviour according to banks' expectations. At the same time, there have been uneven
effects from the same technological innovation across distinct geography.
Table 5: Key Technological Innovations in Electronic Retail Finance, 1979-2001
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Technology opens new opportunities for bank
growth and offers managers of banks possibilities
to achieve high organisational flexibility.
Source: own estimates.
On the other hand, as noted by Pennings and Harianto (1992), the propensity of
banking organisations to adopt technological innovation evolves around the match
between the new application and the resources, capacities and capabilities that
organisations have accumulated over time. Banks have had no proprietary hold on
most of their technology and this has been notably the case with the technology
fuelling the growth of the latest applications (such as Internet banking or middle-ware
solutions). Some established participants in bank markets have responded by offering
non-traditional services like holiday travel (e.g. Midland and Thomas Cook) and real
estate agencies (e.g. Lloyds' Black Horse Agencies). However, the vast majority
responded through new service offerings in core areas and by increasing the diversity
in their products in terms of markets and customer groups. A reduced number of
banking organisations (such as HSBC, BBVA, BSCH, ABNAmro, Deutsche Bank32
and Citigroup) also increased their geographical scope, but most other banks found
little joy in cross-border and foreign operations that failed to match the returns
available in home markets. Participants in bank markets have thus tried to use
technological applications and IT in particular to integrate retail and financial services
into ‘one-stop’ shopping, support volume-oriented sales, and strengthen their brand
name and corporate culture.
As suggested by empirical research documented in Bátiz-Lazo and Wood (1999, p.
25), focus on traditional markets and the creation of new customer groups within
geographical markets, reflects commercial bank managers’ preference to accept a
degree of cross-subsidisation because of its associated stability. Although managers of
banks expect software and hardware developments to enable close control of their
bank’s main profit drivers (idem, p. 25), only a handful of participants in the world
have developed IT applications that provided detailed and reliable profitability
reports. Diversification and greater asset size, therefore, are a solution to managers’
inability to track key economic drivers for individual distribution channels,
service/product offerings, customer group and individual customers.
Concluding that greater diversification and scale are the way forward for financial
service organisations in general and banks in particular is reasonable, given that
managers of banks have failed to take full advantage of opportunities created by IT
innovations. However, there is an apparent paradox when greater diversity and asset
size are pervasive despite technological change, because the expectation that IT
innovation should result in greater specialisation being the typical business model for
participants in bank markets.
The successful use of digital media by wholesale payment systems and the potential
for retail transactions to follow suit, led many (e.g. Taylor, 1998; Browne and Cronin;
1999; Zimmermann and Koerner, 1999; Koerner and Zimmermann, 2000) to conclude
that the ‘virtual bank’ would be the typical organisational form for financial
intermediaries. Although the ‘virtual’ bank is still a broadly defined concept, there is
some general assumption for ‘virtual’ to reflect a tendency towards the prominence of
non-proprietary, computer-based networks that enable a total digitalisation of
financial transactions. As a result, non-finance providers would acquire a low sunk
(i.e. irrecoverable) cost capability to disintermediate established providers in bank33
markets. Table 6 summarises elements which explain the apparent inability of IT
innovations to engineer increased specialisation.
Table 6: Contestabilityof Bank Markets and Technological Change, 1995-2001
(Likelihood the ‘virtual’ bank will be the typical organisational form)
Limitations for electronic-only
retail commercial banking






• Each new technological innovation
accounts for (proportionally) smaller
reductions in price differentials.
• Bank customers remain unwilling to
pay for interfaces for the new
technology, while merchants expect
to share the revenue of new payment
media through lower commission
charges.
• Defection rates remain low thanks to
the inertia of bank customers, which
has been historically high
ix.
• Unknown brand name and associated
high marketing expenditure (to
attract long-term core deposits).
• Greater price transparency.
• Greater convenience to customers
(including congenial resolution of
customer complains through
electronic media).
• Each customer segment interacts
with the bank through the most cost
effective distribution channel.
• Innovations (such as smart cards and
digital cash) that circumvent banks’
proprietary networks with alternative
distribution or payment systems.
• Creation of new customer segments
and improved relationship banking.
Operational Function
Innovation
• The possibility of scale economies
make it very hard for potential
entrants to catch up, even with
technically better systems.
• Continued importance of contextual
non-standardisable elements to
assess risk
• The potential for fraud, money
laundering and systemic failure
requires supervision, regulation and
minimum capital requirement.
• More specialised (and expensive)
labour force.
• Enhanced financial performance due
to reductions in overhead expenses
(i.e. no retail branch network) which
are not offset by reductions in
revenue or increases in other
expenses.
• Standardisation of activities in
payment and lending services
eliminates the uniqueness of banks'
proven expertise and ability to
control losses from payment
activities efficiently.
• Access to a much wider base of
depositors and high rates of asset
growth.
Sources: Group of Ten (1997), McNamara and Bromley (1997), Radecki (1998), Bátiz-Lazo et al.
(2001), DeYoung (2001), and Sebastián (2001).
Some elements which explain the apparent inability of IT innovations to result in
greater specialisation have already been discussed throughout this paper and include:34
• each new technological innovation accounting for (proportionally) smaller
reductions in price differentials;
• possibilities of observing network economies, that is, suggesting that activities
which are critical to develop a competitive advantage in bank markets will be very
hard to match for potential innovations because once some players get started
building proprietary payment networks it will be impossible to catch up, even with
technically better systems.
• trials with smart cards and digital cash showing that bank customers are unwilling
to pay for interfaces for the new technology, while merchants expect to share the
revenue of new payment media through lower commission charges. In other
words, the latest innovations have done little to modify the methods of conducting
transactions between customers and banks. Moreover, they may circumvent
banks’ proprietary networks with alternative distribution or payment systems.
There are two other arguments to conclude that it is unlikely that the ‘virtual’ bank
will be the typical organisational form for financial intermediaries. These relate to,
first, the transferability of skills within banking and second, regulation. Transferability
of skills refers to banks' proven expertise and ability to control losses from payment
activities efficiently (Radecki, 1998, p. 21). Losses from payment activities emerge
from fraud, bankruptcy and operational errors (unique to a bank or system wide). The
control of these losses involves their prevention as well as recovering funds in the
event of a loss. In other words, skills and capabilities associated with managing
payment systems seem readily transferable to lending and would explain why banks
provide both lending and payment services.
According to empirical evidence documented in McNamara and Bromley (1997), IT
applications enabled standardisation of activities in payment and lending services.
However, the same report suggests that superior financial performance could be
achieved when managers were allowed to make discretionary judgements on lending
decisions based on a combination of software driven risk assessments emerging from
elaborate algorithms and other computer applications, with experience and skill-based
judgement. The continued importance of contextual elements to assess risk suggests35
that few banks could engage in volume transactions making indiscriminate use of
technology in core activities.
Secondly, the potential for fraud, money laundering and systemic failure requires
supervision, regulation and minimum capital requirement for organisations supplying
wholesale and retail bank services through electronic media (e.g. Group of Ten,
1997). In the literature, regulation has been viewed as mitigating competition as well
as the hindering the adoption of technological innovation (Baumol et al., 1982).
Hence, the result of regulation limiting the potential of non-banks to contest bank
markets indicates a lengthy move to retail and wholesale electronic-only payment
systems.
In brief, payment systems still rely on bank deposit transfers and central bank-issued
money as a medium of exchange. This suggests that in the foreseeable future the
complete substitution of notes and coins issued by central banks by digital systems
running in high capacity communications media through computers is unlikely.
Transactions involving e-commerce, m-commerce or WebTV have the potential of re-
introducing privately issued currency, but generally banks are strongly positioned as
administrators of local and international payment systems. However, the expected
growth in the volume of payment and banks' lack of proprietary control of technology
suggest that potential threats of entry to bank markets will persist.
4. Discussion
This review set out to determine whether technological change enhanced the
importance of computer systems in the strategy of commercial banks. One early
expectation was that banks' strategic goals would evolve and look to modify the
principal-agent relationship between bank and customer, so the client-bank relations
depend less on loyalty and service quality (i.e. idiosyncratic investments) and more on
financial margin. There is evidence to suggest that on a historical perspective,
technological innovation and, in particular, increasing applications of
telecommunications in bank markets such as telephone banking, electronic cross-
border payment systems or wholesale payment systems, have effectively modified the
external and internal nature of the banking organisation.36
However, the way in which future technological innovation is likely to modify the
banking organisations, both externally (product or service) and internally (operational
function), is at best uncertain. Externally banks are challenged to service the growth in
the volume of payments through e-commerce, m-commerce and WebTV, but
historical evidence suggests that very few IT applications have had an immediate
effect or transformed business practice in bank markets. Indeed, some of the most
promising innovations have failed significantly. Smart new software applications and
innovative hardware interfaces which link new ways of making payments (e.g.
Mondex or VISA Cash) with conventional payment systems are likely to co-exist and
influence the way customers enter the banking system. Banks will continue to be
pressed to resolve operational issues in terms of individual customer risk and
individual customer profitability while, at the same time, continuing to increase size
and diversity. The pre-eminence of conservatism in consumption patterns for retail
financial services will continue to limit the success of the most promising
technological developments.
Internally, technological innovations have increased the leverage of superior
processing relative to capital and other physical resources. Changes in technology
have lowered transaction costs for processing financial transactions and some banks
have been very effective in implementing those innovations. In the future, hardware
and software are expected to provide the platform that will improve banks' multi-
channel management while reducing the cost of co-ordination. But at present, it is
uncertain whether the solution to banks' operational problem will result in
• no-change for the banking organisation;
• the creation of networks of stand alone product/service groups, stand alone
distribution channels and stand alone treasury operations; or
• a combination that allows product/service and channel managers to negotiate deals
independently.
Throughout the technology innovation process, banks have shown that they lack full
proprietary knowledge and capabilities to successfully develop new technological
solutions. This suggests that alliances between banks and technology providers have
greater chances of success than efforts unique to commercial banks or unique to37
technology providers. Managers of banks are thus challenged to excel in the
implementation of these IT-based strategies. Otherwise, poor execution will result in
few ‘ex post’ options and low sustainability of competitive advantage.
On the other hand, technology has helped non-bank providers to enter banking by
reducing price differentials and increasing transparency in organised markets and
creating new customer segments through relationship databases. Technology has also
allowed managers of banks and non-banks to segment relationships by profitability as
well as providing the basis for the development of new distribution channels (e.g.
customer group diversification). However, the possibility to transfer capabilities
between lending and managing payment systems encourages managers of non-banks,
who wish to take advantage of the growth in the volume of payments, to create new
capabilities as a way to gain entry in bank markets.
In brief, the full move away from the branch-centred organisation into virtual banking
will require new IT applications, new managerial practices and new consumption
patterns within the banks’ most profitable market segments. Managers of banks (and
non-banks wishing to enter bank markets) are now challenged to design internal
systems that provide greater control of the profitability drivers and which enable their
organisations to capture new synergy.
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Notes
i Unless otherwise stated, this section borrows freely from Cassell (1984, pp. 62-87)
and archival search of the Board Meeting Minutes (1941 to 1965), Minutes of the
Finance and General Purpose Committee (1941 to 1965), Minutes of the Annual
General Meeting (1923 to 1962) and Notes to Meetings of the Board (1962 to 1976)
from the Co-operative Permanent Building Society.38
ii Notes to Meetings of the Board from the Co-operative Permanent Building Society,
19
th August 1976.
iii With the effect that ‘The banker as a man of stature had been lost.’ (Interview with
senior executive of Lloyds Bank Group, 3 March 1995).
ivStarting in 1977, with the introduction of the Apple personal computer.
vStarting in 1948, with the invention of the first programmable computer.
viCFO, January 1994, pp. 26-33.
viiFinancial Times, 3 May 1995.
viiiidem
ix Even for credit cards where the formalities of changing suppliers are minimal
customer retention rates have also been high historically. See recent surveys of the
UK credit card market in Gilmore (2001) or Bátiz Lazo et al. (2001, p. 875).
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